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The Experience and The Problem of Descriptions: controversy 
of W. Roed and J. Dewey 
In my report I shall discuss what kind of linguistic expressions should be used to 
express content of experience as such. What notions and names can we use to 
describe conditions that let us formulate obtained experience? 
I shall differentiate scientific theory of experience and philosophical theory of 
experience. The first is mainly interested in certain experience that relates to 
certain separate science. The second approach needs to take into account two 
layers of the problem: 
preconditions of possibility to experience something (including experience 
of experience); and aim. structure, methodological ground and framework of 
philosophical theory of experience, which does actually mean that in philoso-
phy we have theory of experience and meta-theory. 
Philosophy of experience should endeavor to study conditions of possibility to 
conceptualize and analyze experience, i.e. to become meta-theory of experience. 
So, basically: what are the limits and bounds of meta-theory of experience, and 
what categories should it use to consistent with its aim. 
Wolfgang Roed, an outstanding Austrian philosopher and historian of philoso-
phy, provides necessary arguments to for the admission that real meta-theory 
of experience is the 'transcendental philosophy'. Professor Roed states that by 
means of transcendental philosophy Kant expressed an idea of sameness of 
theoretical philosophy and theory of experience. 'Transcendental philosophy... 
takes theory of experience as its own topic. It reflects on theories of experience, 
explicates and highlights nature of their concepts, as well as discusses limits and 
modes of their significance.' (Roed, Erfahrung und Reflexion, 1991)- Prof. Roed 
connects transcendental philosophy with history of philosophy: fore in this case 
it will need to devote itself to historical analysis of philosophical approaches to 
experience from the antique times on. 
But how transcendental approach can be united with historical thinking? There 
is an understanding shared by many that philosophical theories of experience 
implicate results and assumptions of the philosophical reflection of their age. 
An example of this presupposition we may find in lectures of John Dewey that 
were published as a book with title 'Reconstruction of Philosophy'. Here, Dewey 
insists that concept of experience is a philosophical construct that resembles 
expectations of philosophers. '[OJld notion of experience was itself a product 
of experience — the only type of experience that was available at the moment 
for people. Now another concept of experience is possible since the quality of 
experience in which it can be experienced has gone through a number of con-
siderable social and intellectual changes compared to experience of older times. 
Notion of experience that Plato and Aristotle had is the notion of experience 
that the Greeks really had.' Dewey insists on dependence of notion of experi-
ence on orientation of philosopher or on historical context he lived in. This is 
actually why Plato and Aristotle were right when they did not recognize role of 
experience in defining universalities and method of finding them. This way the 
meaning of experience was reduced to concreteness and limitedness. However, 
later on in the New Age philosophy have got a new, an emancipative task: a task 
to ruin 'huge lifeless burden' of tradition that was dominating over the man-
kind. Having this in mind, philosophy had another role for experience. It was 
now a criterion to measure lifeless ideas and prejudices. If tradition is overcome, 
as the champions of Enlightenment thought, social structures and science 
would progress fast. Another shift happened in philosophy in late XIX century, 
when philosophy has been developing a new theory of experience. Progress of 
biology and psychology has considerably changed an understanding of process-
es of experience. It could be used, as Dewey thought, 'to propose methods and 
aims for development of new and better experience'. De facto, Dewey assumes 
that contemporary (for him) concept of experience is a tool to take over the 
human environment and to re-orient human behavior. His formula is as the fol-
lowing: to profoundly change human behavior one should change conditions. 
In this way 'experience becomes self-regulating'. One of results of this shift is a 
new correlation of empirical and over-empirical spheres: we may now talk of 
'experimental intellect' that is the source of empirical propositions 'that could 
be applied in a constructive form for new tasks'. 
The pragmatic approach in defining content of notions dictates certain logic of 
those ties and relations that unite this content with its pre-condition embodied 
in community of interprets. But these ties and relations cannot be of historical 
nature as it is stated by Dewey. 'Historization' of pragmatic dimension deletes 
validity and significance of philosophical and scientific notions: it would neces-
sarily mean that whatever truth is stated now it could become false in future. 
Historization of pragmatic dimension of sense devalues its validity. It is a week 
argument for philosophy that decision on validity of a sense should be post-
poned for indefinite future. 
Karl-Otto Apel gives an answer to pragmatic problems. His transcendental prag-
matism comes back to basic interpretation of meaning and experience: something 
is as something. This 'as' is the moment of mediation. This mediation is done 
through three dimensions: syntactic, semantic and pragmatic ones. The latter 
dimension deals with issues of what are conditions of our understanding of a 
meaning and reaching agreement on its interpretation. We cannot deny that ideal 
communicative community is the single most important condition of understand-
ing on that level, while real historical community of interprets is only a derivative 
of it. If agree with this, we have now a formula to understand the structures of 
communication not only between and/or among subjects, but also among differ-
ent communities and different epochs. 
Wolfgang Roed comes to the same answer: he assumes that any positive state-
ment of experience in philosophy reduces it till the level of theory of experience. 
Meta-level philosophy may keep only if it works with problems or problematic 
notions that we find due to comparison of different theories of experience. 
Meta-theory should refrain of positive statements on experience. Wolfgang Roed 
states that transcendental philosophy as an only possible consistent meta-theory 
of experience 'has a task to reflect on those assumptions that define experience 
of objects as possible, as well as define character of validity of these assump-
tions'[11]. This way meta-theory of experience does not support any theory 
as a true one. Meta-theory of experience considers theory of experience as its 
problem and thus it is based on problemativistic approach. Thus, professor Roed 
names his approach problemativism, saying that there are two ways to come 
to the same conclusion, meta-theory of experience could be grounded only on 
basis of refrain of any kind of theory of experience. 
But as soon as we agree on this conclusion, its relation to problemativism pro-
vokes another complication: refusal of positive statement hinders potency of 
thinking on experince and even may lead to interruption of it. How fruitful can be 
problemativism? What heuristic consequences could it have? Wolfgang Roed was 
seemingly aware of this problem. He himself called this as 'heuristic vagueness' of 
problemativistic meta-theory of experience. He proposed to resolve this compli-
cation by repudiation of those propositions that include predicates of existence 
of subject and of an object. Professor Roed adheres to the strategy of abstinence 
of existence' predication until the need arises: a need to ground experience at 
least on a specter of existing thing. Otherwise the both — heuristic and scientific 
— constituents of experience could be lost. As a compromise with this need he 
mentions 'residuum' in experience. This vestige in experience reflects Kant's no-
tion of multitude and Husserl's 'Residuum', which means that even in problemativ-
istic approach a particle of theory of experience is still alive; thus, the meta-theory 
of experience looses its purity and consistency. 
The heuristic vagueness of the problemativistic approaches could be addressed 
by reference to a fact that use of problematized notions gives an access to deep 
structures of experience without need to rely solely on empirical acts in cognition 
of experience. 
